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The Armenian Armed Forces is moving from a conscript force to a volunteer force. They 
are based on a soviet-era military structure, but are attempting to adopt a Western-style of 
force structure, similar to the U.S. and U.K. A key element in this is the establishment of 
a professional NCO corps within the Armenian Army. As they seek to develop the senior 
enlisted ranks, as well as move to an all-volunteer force, they have identified the need to 
re-evaluate their current military pay and compensation structure. This must all be done 
with an eye toward long-term personnel costs, which is currently not happening. 
This project developed a cost model to examine the various life cycle costs of the 
military compensation system for the Armenian Army. The focus is on the structure of 
the Armenian Army peacekeeping brigade and incorporates the new, proposed 
professional NCO corps into a new rank and pay structure. The model allows the 
Armenians to adjust criteria to look at the cost implications of various manpower policy 
decisions. It also provides total compensation costs on an annualized basis, allowing 
policy makers to make informed budgeting decisions. The results show the costs at 
different manpower and rank mixes. 
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Armenia is a former Soviet republic, located in south-central Asia. Since its 
independence from the former Soviet Union, the Republic of Armenia has strived to work 
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in transforming its military to a 
more Western model. Part of this transformation involves the move from conscription to 
a volunteer force, and development of a professional non-commissioned officer (NCO) 
corps. As the Armenian Armed Forces has progressed in this transformation, it has come 
to realize that it needs to modernize its service members' pay and benefits, and further 
understand all the manpower costs involved over the long term. 
This project will develop a life cycle cost (LCC) model of pay and benefits for the 
Armenian Army's peacekeeping brigade (PKB). Armenia has partnered with NATO, and 
supports its peacekeeping operations with a deployable military unit, the PKB. The 
Armenian Army is starting with the PKB in its efforts to develop a professional NCO 
corps and develop a manpower structure that follows that of a best practices Western 
model (U.S. and U.K.). Through the development of a manpower LCC model for the 
PKB, this project hopes to help Armenia understand the cost implications of its 
manpower decisions, as well as how these costs affect budgeting decisions. 
The LCC model will calculate the total LCCs for staffing the PKB. To 
demonstrate the relevance of both current and deferred costs to overall costs, this model 
will project the costs over a 40-year period. This period will include 20 years of active 
duty pay and benefits, as well as 20 years of retirement pay benefits. An additional LCC 
model will also project the current, annualized costs of the deferred retirement pay and 
benefits a service member earns over a 20-year career. This provides the current and 
deferred pay and benefits needed to properly budget these costs each year. 
Due to the limited manpower and cost data available from the Armenian Armed 
Forces for this project, this model will include many assumptions based off of Western 
military models (U.S. and U.K.). These assumptions are documented throughout the 
model, and can easily be changed to accommodate updates or changes to the specific 
 2
information. The model also contains user-selectable inputs to allow for easily adjusting 
the data to different scenarios. 
U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and the Defense Resources Management 
Institute (DRMI) are working with the U.S. Embassy's Office of Defense Cooperation 
(ODC) in Armenia to advise and support the Armenian Ministry of Defense (MOD) in its 
military reform efforts and standardization with NATO.  A move to a more Western 
military model will further U.S. strategic interests in the central Asia region, hopefully 





Armenia is a country not often generally studied in the Western world. As a 
former Soviet Republic, its military is modeled after the old Soviet model. To understand 
the country better, and the impact of the history of Armenia on the current compensation 
system, this chapter briefly reviews the recent history of Armenia. 
The Republic of Armenia is located in the caucus region of central Asia (Figure 
1). It is a land-locked nation, surrounded by the following countries: Turkey to the west, 
Georgia to the north, Azerbaijan to the east and Iran to the south. 
 
Figure 1.  World Map showing Armenia (from World Map-Armenia, n.d.) 
Armenia has a current population of approximately 3 million, and its land area is 
similar in size to the state of Maryland. The terrain is Armenian highland with mountains 
and little forest land. The climate is also considered highland, with hot summers and cold 
winters. The largest lake in the Lesser Caucuses Mountains, Lake Sevan, is entirely 
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within the borders of Armenia. The official language is Armenian, and the country ‘s 
religious base is almost exclusively Christian, with approximately 95% identified as 
Armenian Apostolic (“The World Factbook: Armenia,” n.d.). 
B. ARMENIAN HISTORY 
Armenia’s recent history has been dominated by both the Ottoman and Russian 
empires. On many occasions, the Armenians attempted to unite, but remained separated 
because of various political party interests. To provide some background and context on 
factors that have influenced and shaped Armenia, this chapter will briefly look at some 
important events that shaped Armenian history.  
The Treaty of 1639 was one of the key early events in modern Armenian history, 
as it brought over a century of war and fighting to an end. Armenia was divided into 
Ottoman and Persian rule, and it was’ not until 1828 that Russia annexed Persian 
Armenia, shifting the eastern portion of Armenia from Persian imperialism to a more 
Russian/Western democratic influence. The two Armenia’s remained at odds for the rest 
of the 19th century. Towards the end of the19th century, the failings of both the Ottoman 
and Russian systems led to the emergence of many revolutionary political parties. By 
1892, one of those political parties, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), 
called for a more democratic government in all of Armenia. Among the many common 
elements one would expect in a democratic government, the ARF also pushed for military 
service based on conscription, which still remains today (Libaridian, 2004). 
Early in the 20th century, the Russian government started to institute an anti-
Armenian policy in eastern Armenia, leading to the Armeno-Tatar Conflict from 1905–
1907. Then in 1914, the militant faction of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) 
led the Ottoman empire into war. The Turks led a campaign of “Armenian genocide,” the 
massacre and deportation of over a million ethnic Armenians from western Armenia. 
Russian rule in the Caucasus deteriorated as well, and by 1918, all three Russian 
territories in the region (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) claimed their independence 
(Libaridian, 2004).  
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The independence of the Republic of Armenia was short-lived. The new Republic 
of Armenia attempted to gain control over Western Armenia, which was still under 
Turkish rule. The challenge would turn out to be too great, and in 1920 the Republic of 
Armenia collapsed. By 1921, the land of Western Armenia returned to Turkish control, 
while the former Republic of Armenia in the east was taken over by the newly formed 
Soviet Union (Libaridian, 2004). 
 The views on the Soviet control of Armenia have varied greatly, from saving the 
nation, to a form of slavery, and many variations in between. A key benefit for Armenia 
was the industrialization occurring within the Soviet Union during this time. Armenia had 
the highest rate of economic production of any Republic within the Soviet Union. It also 
had a high number of skilled and educated workers. Many of these skilled laborers were 
living outside Armenia. By the 1970’s, over one million ethnic Armenians lived outside 
of Armenia. They were mainly concentrated in other areas of the Middle East, Europe 
and the Americas (Libaridian, 2004). 
Many factions within Armenia, including the ARF, continued to push for an 
independent Armenia, free from both Russian and Turkish control. During the Cold War 
period, these sentiments toward independence became more anti-Soviet. By 1998, the 
Armenian National Movement (ANM) had started to challenge the communist party in 
government, seeking Armenian independence. By 1990, the ANM had gained control of 
the government in Soviet Armenia. They immediately started instituting democratic 
reforms, and realized that independence was required for democracy. As part of these 
reforms, military conscripts were allowed to stay and serve in Armenia, not other regions 
of the Soviet Union (Libaridian, 2004). 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia focused its efforts on 
democratization and state building. Regionally, Armenia has developed and maintained 
relationships with Russia and Iran, while still maintaining a closed border policy with 
Turkey and Azerbaijan. Internationally, Armenia has sought to expand its relationships 
with the U.S. and the European Union to foster democratization, trade, and to balance its 
regional security interests. When looking at where Armenia is headed, it is helpful to 
focus on three key elements of national power: diplomatic/political, economic and 
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military. Before addressing these individually, a discussion of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict will set the stage for much of Armenia’s national strategy.  
1. The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict 
One of the first major events to shape Armenia’s independence was the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. This started as a border dispute with its neighbor and fellow former 
Soviet Republic, Azerbaijan, over the ethnic background of its people. The conflict had 
such a great impact on Armenia, that it cut across all three national elements of power to 
be discussed here: political, economic, and military. 
Ethnic Armenians predominately inhabited the Nagorno-Karabakh region, within 
the territorial boundary of Azerbaijan (Figure 2). During the years leading up to the 
Soviet breakup, the region voted to move from Azerbaijani to Armenian control in 1988 
(Caspersen, 2013). The dispute for control of this region led to fighting between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, which started in 1988 while both were still Soviet Republics. This 
continued while they both gained their independence from the former Soviet Union, 
finally coming to a cease-fire in 1994. The struggle to reunify with Armenia gradually 
changed into a struggle for independence for Nagorno-Karabakh. This de facto 
independence became a reality with the cease fire in 1994. This is similar to what has 
occurred in other areas of the former Soviet Union and communist-bloc countries, to 
include Kosovo, Abkhazia, South Ossetia. Though only a cease fire, it was the 




Figure 2.  Map of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh (from N. MKHRTARYAN, n.d.)  
Contrary to what is often recounted, the conflict was not triggered by top-down 
politics, but by grass roots movements. Hate narratives were common tools used by those 
involved. The immediate outcome of the conflict was a depressed economy in Armenia 
well into the late 1990s (Libaridian, 2004). Many people left the area, especially the 
young and educated (De Waal, 2003). The ultimate results were displaced people and 
closed borders, continuing a period of depressed economic conditions for Armenia. 
This conflict also provided Armenia an opportunity to build up its military from 
the meager remnants of the old Soviet military. Armenia seized Azerbaijani military 
weapons and equipment as it won battles during the conflict (Papazian, 2008). This, 
along with Russian military aid, allowed Armenia the opportunity to grow its own 
military under the old Soviet model. 
The recognition of Kosovo as an independent state by many of the Western 
powers, in 2008, set a precedent that has emboldened the leaders of Karabakh. Though 
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initially this bolstered their cries for an independent state, they have since temporarily 
given up on this recognition, instead pursuing the continued status quo of unrecognized 
independence (Caspersen, 2013). The longer they can maintain this status quo, the greater 
chance they will later have for de facto independence later on. 
To date, the conflict has not been resolved, though many attempts have been 
made to come to some sort of agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Occasionally, 
small incidents occur along the borders and contested areas, which further heighten 
tensions and make resolution elusive. The distrust between the two nations continues to 
this day. 
2. Diplomatic/Political 
Under the Armenian National Movement (ANM) Armenia was politically stable 
for many of its early years of independence (Papazian, 2008). By 1995, it had adopted a 
national constitution by general referendum. This provided for a liberal democracy based 
off of a Western model. Though Armenia was moving toward a more Western model, the 
continued distrust of political parties remained. This eventually led to the development of 
many smaller, though less influential, political parties (Libaridian, 2004).  
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict also influenced the political process. There were 
many political-military ties in Armenian government. Many movements sought to tie 
economic reforms with those that served in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Papazian, 
2008). The ensuing political battles led to change in political leadership in 1998. 
In 2009, Turkey and Armenia reached an agreement to try to normalize 
diplomatic relations and reopen the border, known as the Turkish Armenian Protocols. 
This normalization between Turkey and Armenia would aid both economically, as well 
as politically. In the end, it failed. For progress to occur, Turkey wanted linkage to a 
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict favoring Azerbaijan, since they have close 
ties to Azerbaijan, while Armenia wanted Turkey to recognize Turkey’s involvement in 
the ethnic Armenian genocide of 1917. Neither happened.  
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Turkey wanted Azerbaijan to regain control of NK, while Azerbaijan would not 
agree to recognize a specific timeline for the NK people to vote for independence. Turkey 
and Armenia seemed to reach for too many concessions from the other side, instead of 
trying an incremental approach. Now, both sides are trying to reach interim steps to more 
stabilize the region as continued non-resolution would risk renewed fighting (Welt, 
2013).  
To this day, charges of political corruption continue in Armenia. Many political 
parties pulled out of the recent presidential election as a protest to the claimed, corrupt 
election process. Because of this, it is no surprise that, in 2013, NGO Freedom House 
rated Armenia as “partly free” in terms of political rights and civil liberties. In context, it 
rates Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh region as “not free” (Nichol, 2013).  
3. Economic 
The free-market economy system, on the other hand, was popular from the start 
(Libaridian, 2004). Armenia currently trades with Russia and Iran. To improve its 
economy, it needs to open its borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan and resume trade and 
economic activity. Two reasons Armenia suffers economically, which it has little control 
over, are that it is landlocked with no seaports, and it has relatively few natural resources. 
Russia has taken advantage of this by manipulating energy supplies and prices in the 
Caucasus. During the 2000’s, Russia gained a virtual control over Armenia’s energy 
supplies, requiring Armenia to maintain favorable ties with Russia. Again, this shows the 
need for improved relations and trade with Turkey and Azerbaijan. 
4. Military 
Armenia was able to build its national army due to high national morale, the 
security threat perceived from Azerbaijan, and the backing and support of Russia 
(Papazian, 2008). They were able to accomplish this even during tough economic times. 
Armenians were overrepresented in the Soviet army, so once they declared independence, 
many came back to serve in Armenia’s army (Papazian, 2008). 
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In 1992, Armenia joined the Commonwealth of Independent States Collective 
Security Treaty, which included Russia and many other former Soviet Republics. This 
organization provided mutual security and aid for its member states. In 2002, this 
organization morphed into the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). A key 
provision of the CSTO was that Russia would maintain two military bases in Armenia, 
leaving over 3,000 Russian troops in Armenia and continuing military ties to Russia 
(Nichol, 2013). 
In 1994, Armenia and Russia reached an agreement where Russia would provide 
troops to help Armenia guard its borders with Turkey and Iran (Papazian, 2008). In 2010, 
Russia and Armenia agreed to extend their basing of troops agreement to 2044. As part of 
this agreement, Russia also agreed to help ensure Armenia’s national security and 
provide modern weapons and military equipment. 
C. NATO INVOLVEMENT 
1. Background 
Armenia has chosen an association with NATO as its best opportunity to further 
its goals of a modern, democratic government and military. This relationship started soon 
after its independence from the former Soviet Union. In 1992, Armenia joined what is 
now known as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). Then in 1994, Armenia 
joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP). According to the EUCOM website, the PfP 
program “aims to enhance cooperation and stability in central and eastern European 
countries while increasing interoperability between partner nations and NATO.”  They go 
on to describe why countries decide to partner with NATO, “ The core objectives PfP 
nations pursue are creating transparency in national defense planning and budgeting 
processes; ensuring democratic control of defense forces; developing interoperable forces 
and command and control structures; and preparing partner nations to contribute to 
NATO operations” (EUCOM Public Affairs, n.d.). 
Armenia’s National Security Strategy goes on to explain the importance of 
Armenia’s participation in the PfP program. The Armenian government believes it is 
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critical to not only develop relationships with the NATO-member nations, but to further 
integrate itself as part of Europe (Gevorkyan, n.d.).  
That brings up an interesting point: that Armenia is trying to further integrate into 
Europe, yet currently has no plans to actually join NATO. This may be its attempt to 
develop and maintain the best possible relationships with two seemingly opposite sides: 
the Western powers (specifically the U.S.) and Russia. 
2. International Partnership Action Plan 
To further develop relationships with NATO, Armenia signed its first 
International Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) agreement with NATO in 2005. An IPAP is 
an agreement between NATO and a country, not yet a member, to further align political, 
democratic, economic and military goals. According to NATO’s website, “such plans are 
designed to bring together all the various cooperation mechanisms through which a 
partner country interacts with the Alliance, sharpening the focus of activities to better 
support their domestic reform efforts” (“NATO - Individual Partnership Action Plans 
(IPAPs),” n.d.). The purpose of the IPAP is for the partner country (Armenia) to set clear 
reform objectives and priorities. NATO will then provide advice and guidance in helping 
the partner country achieve those objectives. Another benefit of an IPAP is that the 
partner country agrees to standards of interoperability among all the NATO nations. This 
makes assistance and unilateral operations much easier to execute. 
The most current NATO-Armenian IPAP covers 2011–2013 (“NATO Individual 
Partnership Action Plan 2011–2013: Armenia,” n.d.). The objectives covered fall into 
four major areas: 1) political and security related issues, 2) defense and military issues, 3) 
public information, science, environment and civil emergency planning issues, and 4) 
administrative, protective security and resource issues. Of interest are the objectives that 
pertain to and guide this project. There are six different objectives identified in the IPAP 
with direct relevance. 
Objective 2.3 calls for the conduct and implementation of a Strategic Defense 
Review (SDR) (“NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan 2011–2013: Armenia,” n.d.). 
This is critical in setting the ground work for reform of the Armenian Armed Forces. 
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Armenia successfully published its SDR in 2011 (Ministry of Defense, 2011). The SDR 
covers the period from 2011–2015. The SDR takes guidance from Armenia’s previously 
issued National Security Strategy (NSS), from 2007, as well as their Military Doctrine, 
which is similar to what the U.S. would call a National Military Strategy (NMS). The 
SDR allows the Armenian government to focus its military efforts on the ever-changing 
political and security landscape the country faces. 
Objective 2.4 focuses on defense budgeting and planning (“NATO Individual 
Partnership Action Plan 2011–2013: Armenia,” n.d.). Not only is Armenia taking a long-
term outlook when it comes to planning their budgets, but they are going to focus on a 
more holistic method of determining all relevant costs- the life cycle cost methodology. 
This project will apply the life cycle cost model to the military compensation system for 
the Armenian Army’s Peacekeeping brigade. 
This leads to the next objective, 2.6.1, which calls for Armenia to establish a 
Peacekeeping Brigade using NATO standards (“NATO Individual Partnership Action 
Plan 2011–2013: Armenia,” n.d.). The standardization allows interoperability with other 
NATO partners and member nations. This Peacekeeping Brigade will ultimately be able 
to deploy a battalion-sized unit, with support elements, in support of NATO operations. 
Within objective 2.7.1, one of the tasks calls for Armenia to develop a 
professional NCO Corps (“NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan 2011–2013: 
Armenia,” n.d.). This reform is a direct move away from the old, soviet-style military and 
towards a Western-style military, similar to the U.S. and UK. Determining the right size 
and shape of this NCO Corps will be important in determining total military 
compensation, and ultimately, life cycle costs. 
The reform of the military’s personnel management system is reflected in 
objective 2.7.3 (“NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan 2011–2013: Armenia,” n.d.). 
Key elements of this include aligning military pay with rank, time in service, time in 
grade, and appropriate qualifications. Retired military pay and benefits is also addressed. 
Including these costs will be crucial in developing a life cycle cost model. 
 13
Finally, objective 2.7.5 calls for establishing a trust fund for expected costs for 
transitioning retired military personnel (“NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan 
2011–2013: Armenia,” n.d.). These costs differ from retirement benefits, as they cover 
programs aimed at transitioning back into the civilian sector. 
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III. MODELS OF MILITARY STRUCTURE 
A. ARMENIA 
Not only is the Armenian military looking to move to a Western model, but 
Russia is as well (Pan, 2009). This movement is as much by necessity as it is by choice. 
When the Soviet Union fell, both countries were forced to look at a more democratic 
model of government, and how that new political system would influence the control and 
structure of the military. 
B. SOVIET MILITARY 
The end of the cold war removed the threat of nuclear war, forcing a natural 
change for the structure of the new, now Russian, government and military. Prior to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the military revolved around centralized leadership. 
Looking back to the 1960’s, Soviet military officer training and education was heavily 
focused on science and technology (Rice, 1987). Condoleezza Rice, in her study of the 
former Soviet Union, noted that this caused a decrease in officer proficiency on military 
matters. By the 1970’s, the Soviet Union refocused its officer corps on the study of 
military history to increase war fighting proficiency.   
The Soviet military lacked civilian staff in its military structure. Whereas the U.S. 
DoD runs a parallel civilian structure at the senior level of DoD leadership, alongside 
senior military leaders, no such system existed in the Soviet system. The civilian 
oversight of the soviet military rested at the top of the organization, in what the Soviet’s 
called the Defense Council. They provided oversight and strategic direction. The 
Ministry of Defense was staffed with military officers and served as the general staff for 
the Soviet military. This organization was concerned with the day-to-day operations of 
the Soviet military (Rice, 1987). This disconnect would pose problems as Russia looked 
to moved toward a democratic system of government after the fall of the Soviet Union.   
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1. Soviet Military Personnel Structure 
The old Soviet military structure was based on conscripted service, like many 
other nations. This system of required military service for young men evolved as Russia 
absorbed the old Soviet structure and made it its own. The length of time that conscripts 
serve has decreased incrementally over the years, from two years down to now one year 
(“Morale,” 2013).  
Since the downfall of the Soviet Union, the Russia military has made attempts to 
move to more of an all-volunteer force, as well as develop the professional NCO corps 
amongst its enlisted ranks. One of the largest obstacles in developing the professional 
NCO corps has been the negative attitude and culture among officers toward the enlisted 
soldiers. The officers in the Russian military have long looked down on enlisted soldiers 
with contempt, treating them as a lower class. This stems from the old communist rule in 
the Soviet Union (Golts & Putnam, 2004).  
The efforts to stifle reform in the Russian military can be traced back to senior 
level military and government officials in Moscow. Though many possible reasons for 
the lack of reform exist, the most plausible seem to be the lack of adequate budgetary 
resources available for the Russian military, and the stubborn, communist mentality still 
evident in many of the older leaders in Moscow. Though Russia has made improvements 
recently, especially in military pay, the reform efforts still have a long way to go 
(Gorenburg, 2011). 
2. Russian Armed Forces Pay and Compensation 
At first look, Russian military officers and soldiers seem to be inadequately 
compensated for their service. Upon further inspection, the total compensation is hard to 
actually identify, as there are numerous types of pays and bonuses. Kier Giles does an 
excellent job of taking a closer look at all these pays. He details how the Russian military 
pay system can be broken down into (3) distinct pays: 1) rank pay, 2) duty pay, and 3) 
additional pays and bonuses (Giles, 2007). 
The Russian military has 20 different ranks across both officer and enlisted ranks. 
This roughly correlates to most Western models, such as the U.S. and UK. Whereas most 
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Western models use rank to determine a large percentage of overall pay compensation 
(generally two-thirds or more), this portion of overall pay for a Russian officer or soldier 
is much less (as little as 5%). There have been improvements and reforms to Russian 
pays more recently (Gorenburg, 2011) but a classic example of the wide disparity can be 
seen in the base pay of a Private. Under the older Russian pay system, the base pay for 
Private was about 400 out of a total monthly pay of about 9000 Rubles (Giles, 2007). In 
comparison, a private in the U.S. Army receives a base pay of about $1500 out of total 
monthly pay compensation of around $2300 (DFAS, n.d.). As one can see, looking at a 
pay table by rank will tell a very different story when comparing Russian military pay to 
Western models. 
The duty pay becomes more complicated, and the largest source of pay 
compensation. Duty pay includes a portion for time in service, as well as a portion that 
depends upon the billet the soldier is currently serving in or the level of command for an 
officer. The duty pay also depends upon whether the soldier is a conscript or a contracted 
professional soldier. Conscript soldiers only have 6 levels of duty pay, whereas a contract 
soldier has 50 different levels (Giles, 2007). Duty pay is a larger percentage of total pay 
than rank pay. 
The additional pays and bonuses can range from special pays for performing 
certain dangerous events, like parachuting and diving, to extra pay for serving on the 
MoD central staff in Moscow. One of the more subjective pays is a yearly bonus for 
performance that most soldiers receive. This pay is determined at the local commander’s 
level, and the system of determining this has often been fraught with corruption. One 
soldier can often receive up to 10 additional pays and bonuses, making up the majority of 
his pay compensation (Giles, 2007). 
The Russian military pay system is prone to inequality and lack of transparency 
(Giles, 2007). Often, soldiers at the same rank, even in the same job, can have vastly 
different total compensation because of the numerous subjective pays. When it becomes 
difficult to see and understand the true monetary compensation earned by a soldier, 
problems with transparency arise. It becomes difficult to properly budget for manpower 
costs when it is not fully understood what all those costs are. Not only are the manpower 
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costs difficult to accurately budget for in each year, but military planners will find it 
difficult to properly manage the size of the force going forward. Full comprehension of 
their total manpower and personnel costs will allow them to better shape their force for 
the future. 
When it comes to retirement, officers have typically been given apartments or 
houses as their retirement benefit. In recent years, this has been jeopardized as fiscal 
issues in Russia have caused the government to delay or even forgo providing this 
retirement benefit. Some officers that are receiving housing upon retirement are getting 
old, dilapidated military base housing on closed (or scheduled to be closed) bases (Pan, 
2009).  
All the problems the Russian military faces with the old Soviet-style personnel 
structure has finally led to some attempts at reforms. At the end of 2011, the Russian 
government began to reform the Russian military pay structure (Gorenburg, 2011). Not 
only does this increase the transparency of its pay structure, but it also improves the 
competitiveness of military pay with the civilian sector. 
C. WESTERN-STYLE MILITARY STRUCTURE AND PAY 
COMPENSATION 
In looking to Western military pay and compensation models, there are many 
benefits that make it appealing to those states still under the former soviet model. As 
mentioned earlier, transparency and equity are two very important aspects of a pay 
compensation system that are lacking in the old Soviet-style pay and compensation 
system.  
In a technical paper on Best Practices in Military Compensation, the authors look 
at competing theories on military compensation, from institutional and market 
perspectives (Angelis & McNab, 2012). An institutional perspective allows for 
comparability of compensation across those with the same rank and skill set. This 
becomes difficult under the old soviet model, as the numerous and varied pays across 
even the same rank provide varying total compensation. The lack of transparency in not 
only the pays available, but also in how they are determined, makes comparability 
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difficult. This also applies to the concept of horizontal equity, where those of similar rank 
and jobs receive approximately the same pay.  A market perspective relies on the 
forces of supply and demand to determine pay for different occupations in different areas, 
as well as competing with the civilian workforce. From a this perspective, the old Soviet 
military pay system does align better, as their duty pay is dependent upon the type of job 
and the location where it is performed. 
When looking at best practices in a total military compensation model, there are 
generally four basic elements included: 
 Basic military pay: includes basic pay, food and housing allowances. 
 Special and incentive pay: includes pay for hazardous duties, as well as 
bonuses for serving in certain jobs. 
 Non-monetary benefits: includes healthcare, education and base services. 
 Deferred compensation: includes retirement pay and benefits. 
This structure for pay and benefits has been successfully implemented by the U.S. 
and UK. Though there are some differences, both nations have effectively applied the 
principles of transparency and equity, along with a balance from both the institutional and 
market perspective. 
U.S. Military basic pay compensation consists of base pay, housing and food 
allowances. Base pay is based on rank and years of total service. A pay chart is published 
each year showing the amounts of pay. The housing allowance is based on rank, whether 
the service member has dependents or not, and the duty station location. This list is 
updated annually. The food allowance is one portion of the U.S. compensation system 
that does not provide for any vertical equity. There is one rate for officers, and one rate 
for enlisted service members. The rate for enlisted is actually higher than the rate for 
officers. This can be traced back to a law that was never updated, which actually is meant 
to pay for feed for an officer’s horse. 
There are numerous special and incentive pays, but an individual will normally 
only qualify for one or two at the same time, if any at all. These pays can be attributed to 
performing special or critical jobs, or serving in hazardous duty locations. Many of them 
are based on rank or length of service relative to performing the specific job. The breadth 
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and details of all these pays go beyond the scope of this project. Important to understand 
is the fact that these tie into the market approach to compensation, allowing the military 
to compete with the civilian sector for critical skills (Angelis & McNab, 2012). 
The non-monetary current benefits are provided to service members regardless of 
rank, as there is no reasonable way to justify basing these on rank or any other criteria. 
These include healthcare, education benefits, and various base support services.  
The main component of deferred compensation is retirement pay. Retirement pay 
is determined by rank and years of service. The other key component is retired healthcare 
coverage. Like coverage while on active duty, this benefit is the same, regardless of rank. 
The UK Military pay and benefits compensation system is similar to the system in 
the U.S.; however, there are (2) key differences: 1) determining basic pay, and 2) 
determining retirement compensation. In the UK, base pay is calculated based on rank 
and service within that rank, not total time in service. The enlisted ranks also are divided 
into two separate pay bands, with those requiring a higher level of technical proficiency 
paying more. There is also no separate line item for housing or food allowances, as in the 
U.S.. These items are included in base pay (“Army Pay Scales,” n.d.).  
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IV. COST CONCEPTS 
This chapter will expand on the military pay and compensation structures 
discussed in the previous chapter. The focus will be on cost concepts relevant to 
developing a life cycle cost (LCC) model. As the Armenian military moves to a more 
Western model, a useful LCC model can serve as a tool to analyze the cost implications 
of manpower decisions. The LCC model will support the recent strategic defense review 
(SDR) initiative as well as facilitate future force structure and manpower decisions. 
A. LCC MODEL 
1. General Description 
What are life cycle costs? Simply stated, life cycle costs are all the costs incurred 
over the life of an item or program. Costs most often occur at different points in time 
throughout the item's or program's lifetime. To compare these various costs at a single 
point in time, usually the present, analysts use a technique called discounting 
(discounting will be discussed later in this chapter). Discounting LCCs allow decision 
makers to compare alternatives based on the present value of all the costs. The initial 
costs usually involve producing, procuring or purchasing the item. Additional costs 
occur, either regularly or irregularly, throughout the lifetime to operate and maintain the 
item. At the end of its lifetime, there are usually costs involved in disposing or 
dismantling the item, and then getting rid of it and its support structure.  
LCC models are often developed as part of a larger cost/benefit analysis, which 
goes beyond just costs to include quantifiable and non-quantifiable benefits as well. A 
key feature of a LCC model is that it only provides an estimate, and that estimate is only 
as good as the data and assumptions used to develop it (NATO, 2007). LCC models go 
on to develop a life of their own. They need to constantly evolve with updated 
information to stay relevant and useful (GAO, 2007).  
The LCC model in this project provides the Armenian Army a means to begin to 
understand all the manpower costs associated with staffing their PKB. As they continue 
on to refine the cost data, validate or change assumptions and refine their organizational 
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structure and staffing, the LCC model will become more useful and accurate. They 
should then be able to conduct analyses of alternatives on a greater scale in the future. 
2. How LCC Models are Developed 
The approach to developing a LCC model is similar to that of other projects. A 
basic four-step approach can be used to develop LCC models. The following section will 
describe these four steps and how they apply to the LCC model for this project (NATO, 
2007). 
a. Define the Aim and Objective of the Project or Study  
This needs to be clearly stated from the outset and understood by all 
stakeholders involved. In this project, the scope of LCC model was confined to the 
Armenian Army PKB. The objective was to try to measure the relevant pay and benefits 
associated with the manpower choices made by military planners. 
b. Establish Cost Structure, Content and Assumption  
It is important to clearly define the cost elements which will be used in the 
LCC analysis. Time may limit the amount or detail of cost elements that can be gathered 
and analyzed. For areas where content or data is not available, the analyst needs to make 
assumptions in order to continue with the analysis. The analyst needs to try to validate the 
assumptions throughout the process of developing the LCCs. The more assumptions that 
can be validated, the more accurate the outcome of the LCC model will be.  
This project broke down the cost elements to into a manageable number of 
cost categories, including current pay and benefits, as well as deferred pay and benefits. 
The addition of the professional NCO corps for the Armenian Army increased the 
number of enlisted ranks into the pay scale. Since the actual staffing and cost data 
available from the Armenian Army was limited, many assumptions on the actual pays 
and value of benefits were used. Because of the limited duration of this project, no further 
updates to assumptions were available. 
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c. Develop the Structure of the LCC Framework  
A model can be a simple spreadsheet or an advanced technique such as a 
simulation or linear programming. The LCC model should be designed so that it takes 
user inputs, and through interaction with the cost elements and assumptions, converts 
them to a usable output. The model should be tested to ensure that the equations and 
formulas produce repeatable and correct results. Sensitivity analysis can later test how 
changes in the assumptions affect the outcome. The structure of the LCC model for this 
project is detailed in the next chapter and sensitivity analysis is presented in the following 
chapter. 
d. Determine the Data and Populate the Life Cycle Cost Framework 
The data must be gathered, from whatever source available and then 
assumptions used where accurate data is not available. These are then placed into the 
LCC model framework to allow the model to calculate the outcome. The next chapter 
details the data and assumptions used for the LCC model in this project. 
3. Military Application 
The US Department of Defense (DOD) defines life cycle costs for a program as 
the "sum of four major cost categories, where each category is associated with sequential 
but overlapping phases of the system life cycle." (Cost Analysis Improvement Group, 
2007). The four major categories that comprise the life cycle costs are (Cost Analysis 
Improvement Group, 2007): 
 Research & Development: These costs are self-explanatory, yet can vary 
wildly. If a new concept or item is being developed, these costs will be 
large. If the program consists of acquiring existing technology or items, 
these costs will be relatively small.  
 Investment: These costs cover the production and/or acquisition costs of 
the item. 
 Operating & Support: Theses costs run for the life of the item or program 
and include the on-going costs to operate and maintain the item or 
program. These costs are often the largest portion of life LCCs. 
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 Disposal: Any costs to get rid of the item or program fall into this 
category. Often there is a salvage value that can be recouped that can 
offset some of these costs. 
So how does military pay compensation fit into these cost categories for military 
programs? There is no easy and exact answer. The key is to try and relate costs associated 
with manpower into a model that is normally used for large programs, equipment and 
gear. The following costs for manpower can be associated with each category: 
 Research & Development: Since the military incurs no costs prior to the 
initial recruiting of service members, there would be no manpower costs 
associated with this category. 
 Investment: This would cover the costs to recruit and provide initial 
accession training (basic training and initial skills training). Recruiting 
costs are reduced under a conscription type of service, as compared to an 
all-volunteer force, as the advertising costs would not be incurred, only the 
costs to process the new joins. These costs are beyond the scope of the 
LCC model developed in this thesis. 
 Operating & Support: This is where the majority of manpower costs occur. 
All current pay compensation (cash and non-cash) are included in this 
category. Deferred retirement benefits are budgeted, based on anticipated 
retirements, and included here as well. 
 Disposal: Separations pay and benefits can be considered disposal costs, 
as these pay and benefits are necessary to transition the service member 
out of the service. This would include payments to those separated from 
the service prior to being eligible for retirement benefits. 
Since the Armenians currently do not use a LCC model to look at their overall 
costs, using a LCC model will help the armed services improve force planning and 
resource allocation. To further understand their total manpower costs, they will need to 
breakdown their manpower costs into the different elements of military compensation. 
These elements are further described in later sections. 
B. DISCOUNTING 
When comparing LCC models for different alternatives, it is very likely that the 
timing and amount of the cash flows will differ between alternatives. This poses a 
problem, since differences in the timing of cash flows can result in different opportunity 
costs and risks, even if the total of the cash flows is identical. In general, there is a 
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preference for deferring cost which means a dollar today is worth more than a dollar in 
the future, often described as the “time value of money”.  
This preference for deferring costs can be quantified using a discount rate1 to 
calculate the total amount in today’s dollars that is equivalent to the future cash flows, 
also known as the Net Present Value (NPV) of the cash flows. The formula for 
calculating the present value of future cash flows is given by the following equation: 
 
where Fn = future value in period n 
  P = present value 
  i = discount rate 
  n = number of periods 
When the NPV of the LCC model is computed, the amount is known as the discounted 
LCC.  
A key benefit of using a discounted LCC model is the ability to compare various 
alternatives (items, programs, manpower, etc) with differing cash flows. The model 
accomplishes this by discounting all the costs, which span various lengths of time, to 
2013. This provides comparison across alternatives using 2013 dollars. NPV can also be 
used to compute the equivalent annuity (equal payments over a period of years) that is 
required to fund retirement benefits in the future. The annuity is included in the 
compensation model to account for the cost of retirement benefits in the current budget. 
C. PURCHASING POWER PARITY 
The foreign exchange rate, or market exchange rate, is used to convert one 
country's currency to that of another. According to the IMF (Callen, 2012), purchasing 
power parity (PPP) is "the rate at which the currency of one country would have to be 
converted into that of another country to buy the same amount of goods and services in 
                                                 
1 In the private sector, the cost of capital is often used as the discount rate. This is the rate of return that 
the entity can get on its money for the next best alternative investment. In the US government, the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) (“Circular A-94 Appendix C | The White House,” 2012) publishes yearly 
guidance on the discount rates. These updates direct federal agencies on the current discount rates to use in 
their cost analysis. 
(1 ) nnP F i  
 26
each country". The two concepts are very closely related, and sound very similar, yet 
each has a distinct application. 
The market exchange rate is appropriate for financial transactions and flow of 
money across international borders. It is effective in exchange calculations on 
internationally traded goods, but it is inherently volatile over the short-term due to market 
and government actions.  
On the other hand, PPP provides long-term stability of exchange rates. It also 
more accurately measures non-traded goods and services when comparing low-income 
versus high-income nations. PPP can be calculated at every economic level, from an 
individual product all the way up to the GDP of a nation. To further understand PPP, the 
World Bank (“What are PPPs?,” 2011) explains that when looking at the national GDP 
PPP between countries, it is not based off of the exact same products and services in both 
countries. The aggregate of goods and services will be different, based off of economic, 
social and cultural differences, but they will still provide a comparable level of 
satisfaction and utility. The downside is that PPP is statistically intensive and much 
harder to measure. As a result, it is not updated/recalculated as frequently as the market 
exchange rate, which is continuously updated. It is also not available for all nations, 
which would then require estimation. 
In this paper, PPP is used to convert military pay from US dollars (USD) to 
Armenian Dram (AMD) for three reasons: 1) it is more stable over time, and 2) Armenia 
is a much lower income nation than the US, and 3) the PPP exchange rate for the 
US/Armenia is available.  
D. COSTS FOR POLICY DECISIONS 
A concept often not fully understood by military planners is that changes in 
manpower policies have direct cost implications. Planners will often be so focused on 
their area of expertise (ex. manpower) that they fail to consider the impact those changes 
have on other areas (ex. costs). Part of the problem for them is they do not know how 
their policy decisions affect costs. Since they do not understand it, it becomes easier to 
just ignore the costs in their entirety. 
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The discounted LCC model is a relevant and appropriate tool that planners can 
use when analyzing the cost implications of their policy decisions. The discounted LCC 
model allows planners to examine various alternatives across a mix of different inputs. 
Manpower planners can more readily see the costs associated with different mixes of 
personnel or levels of staffing. The model created in this project will allow the Armenian 
Army to look at the cost implications of different mixes of ranks, as well as overall size, 
within the PKB. 
E. COSTS FOR BUDGETING DECISIONS 
LCC models can also provide assistance in budgeting over extended periods of 
time. As part of the data collection process in building the LCC model, the analyst 
collects various costs and data. These costs come from different periods of time 
throughout the life cycle. The costs for each specified period of time (ex. year) can be 
aggregated and included into a budget for that period of time. This enables those involved 
in planning budgets to get realistic costs for inclusion in the planning of spending for 
future years. Note that for budgeting purposes an undiscounted LCC is appropriate, since 
we are interested in the actual cash flows required in each year of the budget. 
F. COST OF MILITARY COMPENSATION 
In developing the discounted LCC model, part of the consideration is what 
elements of military compensation to include. The previous chapter briefly introduces 
some of the elements of military compensation used by Western, best-practice models. In 
its simplest form, military compensation can be broken down into cash and non-cash (in-
kind) benefits. Those benefits can be further categorized as either current or deferred 
compensation. For the Armenian MoD, understanding the discounted LCC costs 
associated with the PKB is important for viable force planning and the efficient allocation 
of defense resources.  
Many of these costs can be debated, and have been, by other sources (Asch & 
Warner, 1994), (Goldberg, 2012). Of particular interest, and worth some extra discussion 
here, is how the deferred benefit of retirement pay is often seen as a necessary element of 
overall military compensation. In an effort to reduce personnel costs over the years, the 
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US government has often analyzed whether it even needs to offer retirement pay as part 
of the overall military compensation package (Goldberg, 2012). The opportunity to 
reduce or eliminate deferred compensation not only saves money for the government in 
the near term, but reduces the uncertainty that is inherent in paying benefits at an 
unknown point in the future.  
In an effort to reduce total compensation costs, there have been many agencies 
and commissions that have looked at either changing the military retirement system from 
a defined-benefit plan to a defined-contribution plan, or totally doing away with 
retirement pay (Goldberg, 2012).  A defined-benefit retirement system pays the retiree a 
specified amount, or benefit, in retirement. The financial risk is focused on the benefits 
provider, as that organization assumes the current and future costs for those benefits. This 
is the current retirement system in place for the US military. A defined-contribution plan 
shifts the burden of financial risk of future retirement costs to the employee. The 
employee contributes to the plan while working, and receives the benefits of the growth 
and return of the underlying investment later in retirement. In the private sector, most 
companies provide some sort of matching contributions to what the employee 
contributes. The US military adopted the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) in 2001 (Goldberg, 
2012), a defined-contribution retirement plan. The intent was to offer those military 
members not serving 20 or more years the opportunity to save for retirement. The 
services have the authority to offer matching contributions, but currently none do 
(Goldberg, 2012). 
The question is often asked whether the military still needs a defined benefit 
retirement system, especially since businesses in the civilian sector have greatly reduced 
the use of these types of retirement systems, in favor of less costly defined-contribution 
systems. The military system, in most Western models, is hierarchical with little 
opportunity for lateral entry (exception for medical professionals). This means that 
almost all entrants into military service must come in at the very bottom, whether enlisted 
or officer, and get promoted to move up. With no real lateral entry, an incentive is needed 
for service members to stay for a career in the military. The current defined-benefit 
military retirement system, as found in the US model, provides that incentive.  
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If the US military changed to a defined-contribution system, similar to most of the 
private sector, there would need to be additional incentive for service members to stay 
long-term. Without the additional incentive to stay, like vesting, many service members 
could easily take the education and training offered by the military, along with their 
"portable" defined-contribution plans, and move to the private sector to continue their 
careers. Without the requirement for vesting of government contributions, the service 
member could simply withdraw it, let it continue to grow, or transfer it to another 
retirement plan if they decide to leave the military. Though the in-depth discussion of 
defined-benefit versus defined contribution retirement plans is beyond the scope of this 
project, this brief introduction provides the reader with a basic understanding of how the 
costs affect total military compensation. 
This chapter reviewed the concepts of life cycle costs, discounted life cycle costs, 
and the application of these concepts to manpower costs. If manpower costs are not 
accounted for across the life cycle, then it is likely that policy decisions will be biased in 
favor of costs deferred into the future. Furthermore, a lack of discounting implies a 
constant time value of money, that is, manpower costs today and in the future are 
equivalent. This next chapter develops a life cycle cost model for the Armenian Army 
PKB and examines the sensitivity of these costs to changes in assumptions. 
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V. LIFE CYCLE COST MODEL FOR THE PKB 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this project is to provide the Armenian Armed Forces a life-cycle 
cost (LCC) model that shows the cost implications (total pay and benefit compensation) 
of manpower policy decisions for the staffing of the Peacekeeping Brigade (PKB) over a 
40-year period. This model will show the costs for a 20-year period of use (the manpower 
staffing of the PKB), and then the follow-on period of 20 years of retirement benefits for 
those eligible for a military retirement. The life-cycle period was chosen based on the 
average length of service for an individual plus the expected length of retirement for an 
individual. This approach explicitly recognizes that the Armenian government incurs 
both active duty and retirement costs when it chooses to operate the PKB. Understanding 
this will allow the Armenian Armed Forces to further develop their focus on program 
budgeting, not only for manpower compensation, but all programming and budgeting 
aspects throughout their armed forces. 
To further aid in developing program budgeting, this project also develops a 
compensation cost model that shows total compensation (current and deferred) 
annualized over the career of both enlisted and officer ranks. Whereas the LCC for the 
PKB focuses on the manpower costs for the unit, the annual compensation model 
attributes compensation costs to the individual. This will allow the Armenian Armed 
Forces to scale the compensation analysis to much larger units and organizations, even 
service-wide.  
Both of these models will provide the Armenians relevant analysis in which to 
make different decisions. The LCC model will show the cost implications of manpower 
policy decisions. This should benefit Armenian military planners, as the connection 
between policy decisions and costs is often not made. The annual compensation model, 
which shows current and deferred costs and benefits by year, provides the costs that need 
to be budgeted for it that particular year. This will aid the Armenians as they move from a 
cash accounting system to an accrual-based system. 
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B. DATA 
The model allows the user to make a few basic adjustments to staffing inputs to 
determine the LCC. The data used in computing the LCC is determined through various 
means: input from the Armenian Armed Forces, U.S. (DFAS, n.d.) and UK (“Army Pay 
Scales,” n.d.) military pay models, and professional judgment.  
C. TOTAL MILITARY COMPENSATION 
At the core of this model is understanding all the pay and benefits that go into 
determining a service member’s overall military compensation (see appendix A). This is 
composed of monetary and non-monetary compensation. These pay and benefits were 
broken-down far enough to get clarity on the types of pay and benefits that need to be 
considered, but not so far as to make the model overly complicated or confusing. In 
determining the types of pay and allowances for military compensation, a look at best 
practices identifies three basic parts: 1) cash/monetary, 2) in-kind benefits, and 3) 
deferred benefits (Angelis & McNab, 2012).  
1. Cash/Monetary Benefits 
The most recognized and visible portion of military compensation is pay and 
allowances. These monetary benefits consist of basic pay, food allowances, housing 
allowances, special pay, bonuses and other pay. 
a. Basic Pay 
Basic Pay is the largest portion of military compensation. For this model, 
data for actual Armenian ranks and pay charts were unavailable. As the Armenian Armed 
Forces are moving to a best-practices military compensation model similar to the U.S. 
and UK, this model provided a great opportunity to propose a new rank structure similar 
to the UK Army rank structure for both officer and enlisted (The British Army, 2013). 
The Armenians prefer a pay chart that favors time in rank over time in service when 
calculating base pay at each rank, which is a key differentiator between the U.S. and UK 
military pay scales. The British Army pay charts (see Appendices B & C) were the 
starting points for converting to a new Armenian Army pay chart (see Appendices D & 
 33
E). Since this model develops the LCC’s for the Armenian Army PKB, the British Army 
rank structure and pay chart is the most applicable comparison for developing the 
recommended new Armenian Army rank and pay structure. All pay charts contain annual 
pay amounts. 
(1) Officer Rank & Pay Chart. The new officer rank structure 
for the Armenian Army mirrors the current UK system (British Army). For this model, 
the ranks go from O-1 to O-7. For the PKB, the senior billet is the Brigade Commander. 
This level of command is at the O-7 (Brigadier) rank in the UK, which is different from 
the U.S. military model, where a Brigade Commander is typically an O- 6 (Colonel). Of 
note is that this disparity also occurs at the Company Commander level, where in the UK 
Army rank structure, an O-4 (Major) is typically a Company Commander, whereas in the 
U.S. model it is an O-3 (Captain). These differences are most likely due to the difference 
in size of each country’s armed forces, but do not affect any calculations within the 
model itself. 
The British Army Officer pay scale adjusts pay by rank and time in 
grade (that particular rank). The base pay increases for each additional year spent at that 
rank. The British pay scale refers to those increases in pay at a particular rank as a 
“level.” Since there will be many soldiers at the various officer ranks throughout the 
PKB, the model does not need to be complicated by accounting for every possible level 
of pay within a rank. This model will use the median level from each officer rank, as 
taken from the British Army pay scales, in determining the basic pay portion of the total 
compensation. This means there will be only one pay assigned to each officer rank when 
converting base pay from the British system. 
(2) Enlisted Rank & Pay Chart.  The new enlisted rank 
structure for the Armenian Army should include the proposed new ranks for the 
professional NCO corps. This model integrates these new ranks for the professional NCO 
corps (Squad NCO, Platoon NCO, Company NCO) using the current British Army 
enlisted pay scale, which has only seven enlisted ranks. In order to allow easier future 
integration/comparison with the U.S. military enlisted pay scales, if needed, the new 
proposed pay scales for the Armenian Army cover nine ranks (E-1 to E-9). Based off the 
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level of responsibility of the current British enlisted ranks, and how the new professional 
NCO corps fits into that, the additional two ranks/pay grades are integrated at the bottom 
of the pay scale. This creates two separate pay grades for Private (E-1, E-2), and two 
separate pay grades for Lance Corporal (E-3, E-4). For simplicity sake, this model does 
not create a new name for the new pay grades. That can be done at a later time if the 
Armenian Army so chooses. 
The British Army Enlisted pay scale adds another differentiator for 
pay, beyond the levels for time in grade. Occupational specialties are broken down into 
two categories: higher spine and lower spine. Occupational specialties that fall into the 
higher spine are those that require greater technical expertise, as determined by the 
British Army, while the remainder of occupational specialties fall into the lower spine.  
Pay in the higher spine is more than the lower spine. The U.S. equivalents to the UK 
higher and lower spine pay bands are the various special pays, incentive pays and 
bonuses. These are paid to service members in more technically demanding jobs, as well 
as in more dangerous jobs.  
In determining a single, average pay to use for each enlisted pay 
grade in this model, the median pay level for each grade was used. This is similar to how 
officer pay was determined for each rank. Within that pay grade, the pay for the higher 
and lower spine was computed using a weighted average. Because the basic structure of 
the Armenian Army PKB is a ground combat infantry brigade with associated combat 
service support, there would be far fewer higher spine occupational specialties than lower 
spine ones. This model weights the higher spine pay at 20%, and the lower spine pay at 
80% when determining the median pay for each rank. This is a realistic weighting of the 
number of higher versus lower spine occupational specialties within the PKB. This can be 
adjusted if logic changes at a later date. Since the Private and Lance Corporal ranks each 
had two pay grades, the pay levels used to calculate pay for those particular ranks were 
evenly spread across the pay levels associated with those ranks. 
(3) Pay Conversion.  Once the new pay charts are set for both 
officer and enlisted, the base pay for each rank must be converted from British Pounds 
(£) into an equivalent pay for the Armenian Army in Armenian currency (AMD). The 
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first step is to convert the base pay from British economic purchasing power into the 
equivalent purchasing power in Armenia. The model accomplishes that by using 
purchasing power parity, which was described in the previous chapter. The IMF website 
provides the economic data to convert the purchasing power from the UK to Armenia 
(IMF, 2013). Appendix F contains the actual values used to convert the purchasing power 
from the UK economy to the Armenian economy. This new pay amount is still valued in 
British Pounds (£). It must be converted to Armenian Dram (AMD), based off of 
currency conversion rates, to get the new base pay amount for each officer and enlisted 
rank. Since currency conversions are volatile and are adjusted daily, this model uses the 
average currency conversion rate for the previous 12-month period. This provides a more 
stable, realistic conversion rate. Appendix F contains the conversion rate data. 
b. Food Allowance 
The food allowance portion of monetary compensation provides the 
service member with pay to compensate for food subsistence. This may or may not 
include an amount for dependents. For the model, there is no additional monetary 
compensation for food because it is already included in the base pay that was calculated 
from the British Army pay chart. 
c. Housing Allowance 
The housing allowance portion of monetary compensation provides the 
service member with pay to assist in securing housing. This may or may not include an 
amount for dependents. For the model, there is no additional monetary compensation for 
housing because it is already included in the base pay that was calculated from the British 
Army pay chart. 
d. Special Pay 
Special pays include any additional pays, above basic pay, that may be 
paid to a service member for performing specialized jobs, working in hazardous 
environments, or similar scenarios. Examples would include pay for maintaining flight 
status, handling of explosives or other dangerous material, or serving in a combat zone. 
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This model will initially not include any special pay, as there is no specific information 
readily available from the Armenian Armed Forces on special pay policy. Some of this 
already taken into account when converting from the British Army enlisted pay spines, as 
mentioned earlier. An arbitrary amount could be assigned for this category, based off 
U.S. averages per service member, but to keep the model as simple and realistic as 
possible, no amounts will be included. 
e. Bonuses 
Bonuses are monetary compensation received upon initial or subsequent 
reenlistment, or for agreeing to serve a predetermined amount of time in a particular field 
or specialty. As with special pay, this model does not include any amounts due to lack of 
guidance from the Armenian Armed Forces.  
f. Other Cash Compensation 
This category was included to allow the Armenian Armed Forces to easily 
add any other types of monetary compensation to the model in the future. Initially, there 
no amounts included in this category. 
2. In-kind Benefits 
The next major category of military compensation is the in-kind benefits. These 
are non-monetary benefits provided to the service member, yet these are costs incurred by 
the armed services to support each service member, so they must be included in total 
compensation costs to ensure all costs are taken into account. For this model, the in-kind 
benefits are broken down into 4 separate categories: active-duty healthcare, family 
healthcare, education benefits, and other in-kind benefits. Again, these categories closely 
resemble how Western best-practice models (Angelis & McNab, 2012) would look at in-
kind benefits. 
a. Active-Duty Healthcare 
The active-duty healthcare costs include providing medical and dental 
services to the active-duty service member. This is generally the most expensive portion 
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of in-kind benefits, and must be recognized as such. With little information from 
Armenia to determine the healthcare costs, the model aligns the costs with how much the 
U.S. and UK spend on military healthcare. 
The model calculates the active-duty healthcare cost by first using the 
healthcare cost per capita for active-duty U.S. military personnel, as presented in a recent 
study comparing active-duty and reserve force military costs (Reserve Forces Policy 
Board, 2013). This cost must be converted from economic purchasing power in U.S. 
Dollars to Armenian Dram through purchasing power parity. When looking at healthcare 
costs in the U.S., UK and Armenia as a percentage of GDP (The World Bank, n.d.), the 
UK spends about two times more on healthcare than Armenia, while the U.S. spends 
approximately four times as much as Armenia. This model takes that spending in national 
healthcare into account, and goes beyond just purchasing power parity. Since the U.S. 
spends approximately four times as much as Armenia, the model reduces the amount 
assigned to active-duty healthcare by three quarters. Since there is no data to suggest that 
there are any significant differences in healthcare costs for military age service members, 
and since modern militaries do not use rank in determining healthcare benefits, the 
amount calculated for active-duty healthcare will be the same amount across all ranks. 
b. Family Healthcare 
The family healthcare coverage is for the legal dependents of the active-
duty family member, covering their medical and dental needs. The cost of this is typically 
covered by modern, Western militaries like the U.S. and UK. Due to lack of data from the 
Armenian Armed Forces on this subject, this model will not make any determinations on 
costs of coverage. This category will remain in the model to allow the Armenians the 
ability to include this cost in the future, if needed. 
c. Education Benefits 
This category covers any educational benefits provided to the service 
member or legal dependents. This may include costs for post-secondary education, 
technical training, or various other non-military educational programs. In the US, this 
would include benefits like the GI Bill and tuition assistance. No data is currently 
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available from the Armenians, so this model will not include any educational benefit 
costs; however, they can be added in the future, if needed. 
d. Other In-kind Benefits 
Any other benefits provided to the service members can be included in this 
category. To keep the model as simple as possible, this category of benefits is initially not 
filled with any projected costs. The Armenian Armed Forces have not provided any 
information on how or if to include this. For future use, this may include costs for various 
base services, base operations support, commissaries, exchanges, and any other benefits 
provided to service members that the Armenians would like to allocate the costs (Angelis 
& McNab, 2012). 
3. Deferred Benefits 
While the monetary/cash and in-kind benefits are received in the present, deferred 
benefits are received sometime in the future. In dealing with military compensation, 
retirement benefits are those received at some point in the future, and like current 
compensation, usually consist of both monetary/cash and in-kind benefits. In this model, 
deferred benefits include: 1) retired pay, 2) retired healthcare, 3) retired housing 
assistance, and 4) other retired benefits. These costs are often overlooked, under 
estimated or even ignored when comparing various costs. This LCC model accounts for 
these deferred benefits when determining the overall cost of various options.    
As the Armenians move to the Western model, the main cost driver for deferred 
benefits will become retired pay. Since they have not adopted these new deferred benefits 
yet, this model will include many assumptions for the deferred benefits. In determining 
those service members that qualify for retirement benefits, the model will incorporate the 
same criteria used in the U.S. model. For officers, only those that attain the rank of O-4 
and higher will be able to stay to at least 20 years of service and be eligible for retirement 
benefits. For enlisted soldiers, those that attain the rank of E-6 or higher will be able to 
serve for at least 20 years and draw retirement benefits. 
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a. Retired Pay 
In order to keep the model as simple as possible, the retired pay benefit is 
more closely related to how U.S. military retirement is calculated, as compared to the UK 
model. The model uses the final pay at year 20, and multiplies that by 30% to determine 
the annual retired pay amount for each year in retirement. No yearly increases for 
inflation are included since constant dollars are used in the model. Since this model is 
based on the UK model of active duty pay, which combines all base pay, food and 
housing into one base pay category, the 30% figure represents a close approximation in 
how retired pay is calculated under the U.S. military retirement system, which starts with 
50% of just base pay. 
b. Retired Healthcare 
Similar to the U.S. model, this will cover some of the costs of medical and 
dental coverage for the retired service member and legal dependents. The calculations 
used for determining the cost for this category are similar to those used in determining 
the active duty healthcare. The starting point is the cost per capita for retired military 
healthcare, as determined by the same study cited in the active duty healthcare section 
(Reserve Forces Policy Board, 2013). This is then multiplied by the PPP, and then the 
currency conversion rate. It is divided by a factor of four, for the same reason as the 
active-duty healthcare conversion cost, to arrive at the cost used in the model. This cost 
only covers the service member. A factor could be added in to account for the cost of 
covering legal dependents, but this model does not include that at this time. 
c. Retired Housing Assistance 
To offer the ability to look at costs from the legacy soviet compensation 
model, this model includes a category to account for any housing benefits provided to 
service members in retirement (Pan, 2009). In helping compare costs, this model assumes 
a one-time housing benefit will be paid to the service member at retirement, equal to 10% 
of annual retired pay. This one-time payment is then annualized across the 20-year 
retirement portion of the LCC model, using a 3% discount rate. This amount could just as 
easily be the value of a house or apartment provided as the only retirement benefit. 
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d. Other Retired Benefits 
This category was placed into the model to allow the Armenians to easily 
add any other retirement benefits at a later date. This model will initially not include any 
specific benefits in this category. 
The core of this model is the total compensation breakdown for each rank, 
both officer and enlisted. Compensation was divided into monetary/cash and in-kind 
benefits, and also between current and deferred. With an understanding of the actual 
compensation, the next section explains the actual user inputs to the model. 
D. INPUTS TO UNIT MODEL 
As with many parts of this model, Armenian guidance and inputs for the model 
have been very limited. After receiving the basic manning and structure of the Armenian 
Army’s 12th PKB (Major Aaron Cummings (USA), 2013), it made more sense to build 
the model off of rank structure instead of unit structure. The Armenians were not able to 
provide enough fidelity on specific unit structures, and that would have made the model 
itself difficult to organize. The ability to input all the various ranks allows the user an 
infinite amount of flexibility in creating or adjusting manning levels for military units of 
any size. 
The user input to the model was designed to be very simple and intuitive to use 
(see Appendix H). The model allows the user to input the number of personnel at each 
rank, and then uses those numbers to propagate the model.  The input controls can be 
defined along a certain range, which ensures the user can only input numbers within a 
realistic range. 
To allow some flexibility for future changes to the model, an additional section 
allows the user to change the mix of ranks at any time during the 20-year life cycle of the 
PKB (see Appendix I). Those changes would take place in the year the user designates, 
and then carry-forward those changes throughout the remaining 20-year life cycle. 
Further adjustments to the inputs for the total compensation categories (monetary, 
in-kind, and deferred) can also be changed at any point in the future, but require someone 
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with knowledge of the model’s structure to insert those changes within the formulas 
inside the model. These would be separate from the end-users inputs. 
E. COMPUTING THE LCC OF THE PKB 
Once the user has input the number of service members at each rank, and any 
changes to manning at any point in the 20-year active portion of the PKB, the model will 
provide the total life cycle costs to support that manning level. The model presents the 
total costs for each rank and each year during the active-duty 20-year period of the PKB 
(see Appendices J &K). The total retirement costs are also shown, broken down by rank 
for each year of the 20 years of retirement benefits (see Appendix L). There is no 
inflation or cost of living adjustment factored into the model. 
F. INDIVIDUAL MODEL–ANNUALIZED COST OVER A CAREER 
A second model is included, which builds off the total compensation, by rank, 
used in the main model. Where the main model focuses on LCC of the unit itself, this 
secondary model focuses on the total costs of a soldier or officer as he progresses 
throughout his career. The key difference is that it includes the deferred retirement costs 
annualized into each year of active duty, to gain a true sense of the total cost attributed to 
each soldier and officer. The intent is no provide another tool to compare total costs 
across different ranks. 
The model assumes a 20-year career on active duty. There is a model to 
correspond to an enlisted career path, and then one to correspond to an officer career 
path. The model attempts to follow a similar promotion timeline as the British Army, 
with any gaps or ambiguity being smoothed out by how the U.S. military system 
promotes, in general. 
1. Inputs to the Individual Model 
The inputs are, again, simple and intuitive. Whether the enlisted or officer career 
path is selected, there are three user inputs (see Appendix M):  
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 Rank at retirement- the inputs are limited to E-6 through E-9 for enlisted, 
and O-4 through O-7 for officers, the same retirement criteria used in the 
main model. 
 Years of payments in retirement- the user can select how many years of 
retirement payments to use to determine the deferred costs accrued during 
active service. By allowing the user to adjust this, different scenarios can 
be modeled. For instance, the user could use a expected life span in 
retirement to determine the years of payments, or it could be based off just 
a set a number of years. 
 Discount rate for calculating payments- this rate is used for determining 
the value of the retirement annuity, which is then used to determine the 
annual deferred costs to be included during the active duty years. 
2. The Individual Model 
Whether enlisted or officer, the model calculates the costs the same way. The 
model follows the promotion timeline for the enlisted or officer career path, until it 
reaches the rank that was input by the user as the rank a retirement. That rank is  
then used the remaining years until reaching 20 years of active service. The model uses 
the monetary/cash and in-kind benefits from the total compensation, by rank, determined 
from the main LCC model, for each year, based upon the rank at that year (see  
Appendix N). 
The model then determines the total value of those benefits at the year of 
retirement. The pay and benefits received in year 20 are the basis for determining 
retirement pay. The years of retirement pay, and the discount rate, are input by the user 
on the front-end of the model. The total value of those yearly annuity payments are 
discounted to the date of retirement, to provide the present value of all retirement 
benefits, at the start of military retirement. 
That lump sum benefit, at the end of year 20, is then annuitized over each of the 
previous 20 years of active duty, based on the discount rate initially entered by the user. 
This provides an annual cost of deferred compensation, which is then included with all 
the current pays and benefits, to get a total compensation cost for each of those 20 years 
of active service (see Appendix O). This look at total annual compensation costs provides 
realistic total costs to use for budgeting purposes. 
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VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARMENIAN ARMED FORCES 
Now that the life cycle cost LCC model is constructed, the Armenian Army can 
explore various cost scenarios by manipulating the model. This chapter will look at the 
total LCCs under their current personnel end strength and rank structure. Then the model 
will show the costs as the rank structure is optimized, and again after the peacekeeping 
brigade PKB reaches its recommended end strength. Finally, a sensitivity analysis will 
look at how costs are affected by a change in the retirement pay calculation, as well as a 
change in the retirement benefit itself. 
A. COSTS UNDER CURRENT SYSTEM 
The data available from the Armenian army has been minimal. The current 
breakdown of personnel, by rank grouping, for the PKB is: 200 officers, 80 warrant 
officers and 200 sergeants and below (Major Aaron Cummings (USA), 2013). This is 
very similar to the old Soviet military rank structure model. Even the modern-day 
Russian Army has maintained a personnel structure where 25-33% of the total force are 
officers (Weitz, 2010).  
Unfortunately, there is no further breakdown of personnel, by rank, available. For 
the model, assumptions on the actual mix of ranks was made based on the actual unit 
structure for the PKB (see Figure 3), an officer-heavy rank structure like the old Soviet 
model, and how those type of units would be manned based on a Western model. The 
total LCCs, in constant 2013 Armenian Dram (AMD), for manning the PKB at the 
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Table 1.   Current Armenian Army PKB Staffing Level and Costs (in constant 2013 
ADM) 
B. COSTS UNDER RECOMMENDED STRUCTURE CHANGES 
The next analysis estimates the LCCs for two different scenarios: 1) maintaining 
the 480 total end strength, but optimizing the mix of ranks, and then 2) increasing the end 
strength to a desirable staffing level for a brigade of this nature, while maintaining a 
desirable mix of ranks. The first scenario looks to reduce total LCCs by using a Western 
Brigadier (O-7) 1 Bn/Rgt NCO (E-9) 20
Colonel (O-6) 2 Company NCO (E-8) 60
Lieutenant Colonel (O-5) 10 Company Sergeant (E-7) 10
Major (O-4) 30 Platoon NCO (E-6) 10
Captain (O-3) 57 Corporal (E-5) 25
Lieutenant (O-2) 60 Lance Corporal (E-4) 30
2nd Lieutenant (O-1) 40 Lance Corporal (E-3) 75
Total Officer = 200 Private (E-2) 25
Private (E-1) 25
Total Enlisted = 280
Total Manning = 480
Officer Staffing Enlisted Staffing
Initial Staffing




model for staffing the PKB.  The second scenario increases total LCCs because of the 
increase in overall end strength, which supports Armenia's strategic goals of supporting 
NATO. 
1. Change in Rank Mix 
If the Armenian Army cannot afford to increase the staffing level of the PKB, 
then it can at least optimize the mix of ranks to achieve some cost savings. The current 
staffing of 480 total soldiers is more comparable to a battalion-size unit, not a brigade 
(from NATO standards). The total current officer structure (200) equals 42% of the total 
end strength of the PKB. This if far too many officers for this size of deployable ground 
unit. In the US military, for perspective, the officer corps makes up 17.25% of the entire 
US Army, and only 10.9% of the entire USMC (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense (Military & Community and Family Policy), 2012). It would be more 
appropriate to model this unit after an infantry battalion, whose officer structure is even 
smaller than the serviced-wide officer structure noted above, usually only about 5-6% of 
the total unit structure (USMC, 1998).  
The recommended rank structure breakdown would be 30 officers and 450 
enlisted (see Table 2). This starkly contrasts the current 200 officers and 280 enlisted 
(including warrant officers) PKB staffing structure. The Armenian Army is staffed too 
heavily with officers and would need to cut a large portion of those officers, either 
reassigning them or separating them. Either option would probably cause problems with 
unit and individual morale, as well as additional costs in transferring and separating those 
affected officers.  
The change in rank mix would cause a shift toward more lower ranking soldiers 
and officers within the PKB. Having more lower ranking soldiers would reduce pay and 
benefit costs for the Armenian Army. This would translate into an estimated total LCC, 
over the 40-year period, for the PKB of 29,463,021,134 AMD. This would provide the 
Armenians a savings of almost 10.6 billion AMD over the 40-year life of the PKB, about 




Table 2.   Recommended Rank Structure and Cost (in constant 2013 ADM) for 
Current Armenian Army PKB Staffing Level 
2. Change in Size and Rank Mix 
The current personnel end strength of the PKB is well below the size of typical 
infantry brigade, whether you look at the old Soviet model or a current Western model. In 
a Western model, an infantry brigade is typically commanded by a Brigadier (O-7) or 
Colonel (O-6). The infantry brigade generally numbers between 3000-5000 in both the 
Brigadier (O-7) 0 Bn/Rgt NCO (E-9) 2
Colonel (O-6) 0 Company NCO (E-8) 8
Lieutenant Colonel (O-5) 1 Company Sergeant (E-7) 20
Major (O-4) 3 Platoon NCO (E-6) 30
Captain (O-3) 7 Corporal (E-5) 40
Lieutenant (O-2) 10 Lance Corporal (E-4) 70
2nd Lieutenant (O-1) 9 Lance Corporal (E-3) 180
Total Officer = 30 Private (E-2) 70
Private (E-1) 30
Total Enlisted = 450
Total Manning = 480
Officer Staffing Enlisted Staffing
Initial Staffing




US and UK military. In fact, NATO has modeled its response force off the structure of 
the USMC Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) (Mihalka, 2005).  Since Armenia is 
trying to mold the PKB to fit the NATO standard, it is appropriate to use the US model as 
a goal. 
Since the PKB is currently only staffed with 480 soldiers and officers, a more 
realistic staffing goal would be at the bottom end of the range for a size of a typical 
infantry brigade, which would be approximately 3000 soldiers and officers. With this 
larger size, it now becomes appropriate to staff the PKB with a brigade headquarters 
element. This will bring the overall size of the officers within the PKB to almost 7%, up 
from just over 6% under the initial staffing structure.   
The recommended mix becomes 200 officers and 2800 enlisted (see Table 3). 
This should support a structure of two-three infantry battalions, one combat service 
support battalion, and one headquarters battalion. This mix would allow the Armenian 
Army to keep its current PKB officer staffing level (200) and not have to reassign or 
separate any of them. They can then either transfer in or recruit/conscript the additional 
soldiers needed. 
The total 40-year LCC to staff the PKB under this scenario is 187,137,059,859 
AMD, in constant 2013 AMD. This will undoubtedly pose a fiscal challenge for the 
Armenian Army, as the current estimated LCCs for the PKB are only just over 40 billion 
AMD, an increase of well over four-fold. The Armenian MOD will have to determine 
whether the increased costs are worth the additional non-monetary strategic benefits of: 
 increased interoperability with NATO. 
 stronger relationships with NATO countries and NATO partner nations. 
 furthering their national security objectives, within the context of the their 
recent SDR. 




Table 3.   Recommended Rank Structure and Cost (in constant 2013 ADM) for Full-
Strength Armenian Army PKB Staffing Level 
C. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
1. Change in Retirement Pay Calculation 
The LCC model calculates retirement as 30% of active-duty pay. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, this model comes close to the US military model for retirement pay 
calculations, which starts at 50% of base pay (not including housing and food allowance) 
Brigadier (O-7) 1 Bn/Rgt NCO (E-9) 13
Colonel (O-6) 3 Company NCO (E-8) 48
Lieutenant Colonel (O-5) 11 Company Sergeant (E-7) 125
Major (O-4) 35 Platoon NCO (E-6) 190
Captain (O-3) 40 Corporal (E-5) 250
Lieutenant (O-2) 60 Lance Corporal (E-4) 450
2nd Lieutenant (O-1) 50 Lance Corporal (E-3) 1100
Total Officer = 200 Private (E-2) 440
Private (E-1) 184
Total Enlisted = 2800
Total Manning = 3000
Officer Staffing Enlisted Staffing
Initial Staffing




at 20 years of service. If the Armenians are unable to afford this amount, or think it is too 
generous, they can lower the retirement factor in the model to reduce overall retirement 
costs. 
This analysis is based off the recommended structure of 3000 personnel. If the 
retirement factor is reduced from 30% to 20 % of active-duty pay, the total savings over 
the 40-year life of the PKB would be almost 3.5 billion AMD (see Table 4). This 
amounts to a 30% savings in retirement benefits, but only a 2% savings in overall costs, 




Table 4.   Change in Retirement Factor on Costs (in constant 2013 ADM) 
2. Change in Retirement Benefit 
Another part of the LCC model that can readily be adjusted is the retirement 
benefit itself. The second part of the model, showing the deferred retirement benefits 
budgeted for each year (see Appendices N and O), calculates the retirement benefits for 
each of the 20 years immediately following retirement. This is derived from the US 
model, where a service member can receive 50% of his base pay after 20 years of active-










the retirement benefits so that the service member receives one lump sum payment 
immediately upon retirement, and for simplicity sake, another lump sum payment 20 
years later. This is similar to the UK military, which offers a lump sum at retirement, and 
then another lump sum at age 65. 
For this analysis, an example for both enlisted (E-8) and officer (O-5) is compared 
between the two scenarios mentioned in the previous paragraph. The present value of 
both options is compared using the same discount rate of 4%. The second option assumes 
a one-time payment at retirement equal to the final year's active-duty pay, for that rank, 
plus another payment 20 years later, again equal to the final year's active-duty pay. It 
does not include the healthcare and housing assistance benefits that are part of the 
original retirement benefits calculation.  
The total savings in retirement benefits paid to an E-8 are over 12 million AMD, 
while the savings for an O-5 are almost 22 million AMD (see Table 5). These costs are 
all discounted to the time of retirement. Under this second scenario, which would more 
closely resemble a UK model, retirement benefit costs could be slashed by two-thirds. 
The amount for each payment (at retirement and again 20 years later) was selected 
arbitrarily, but represents a realistic option and is intended to show how much can be 




Table 5.   Change in Retirement Benefit 
Since the Armenian Army does not currently have a mature military retirement 
system, the options described above, reflecting similarities to the US and UK models, 
offers a starting point to further develop their retirement system. As mentioned in chapter 
4, the military retirement system in a Western model must incentivize service members to 
make the military a career. In most current Western models, that is approximately 20 to 
30 years of service. As Armenia further develops its military retirement system, it needs 
to determine the amount and type of incentives (pay or benefits) that allow it to meet its 
military personnel staffing goals, while minimizing its expenditure of financial resources 


















This project supported the ongoing efforts of the Defense Resources Management 
Institute (DRMI) and U.S. European Command (EUCOM) in helping the Armenian 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) further develop its national security strategy (NSS). Working 
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) , the Armenian Armed Forces are 
moving to adapt to a more Western model for force structure, to include the development 
of a professional NCO Corps. This has introduced new fiscal challenges for them, as they 
try to standardize the Armenian Army peacekeeping brigade (PKB) with the NATO 
structure.  
To aid the Armenian Armed Forces in the development of the PKB, this project 
developed a recommended professional NCO corps rank structure, which aided in 
furthering the move to a Western model for military manpower. This new, recommended 
rank structure then became the base for developing a total manpower life cycle cost 
(LCC) model for the Armenian Army's PKB. The LCC model provided the Armenian 
Army the ability to look at both the policy implications of manpower decisions, through 
the use of the 40-year total LCC model for the PKB, as well as the costs of budgeting, 
through the annualized manpower cost model.  
The key conclusion drawn from this analysis is that the Armenian Army needs to 
reduce the size of its officer corps.  Its current officer to enlisted ratio is reflective of its 
Soviet legacy. The current efforts to move to a more Western model of military 
manpower and structure will help bring the size of the officer corps down, in line with 
Western models. The costs saved in paying for less officers can be partially used to offset 
the recommended increase in enlisted staffing of the PKB, which will help to meet larger 
Armenian NSS objectives.  
Another conclusion is that the Armenian Armed Forces need to decide on their 
updated military pay and benefits as soon as possible, as this will greatly affect their 
manpower costs.  This model used many assumptions for manpower costs, and these 
need to be refined to develop more realistic costs for the future.  
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Finally, the Armenians will need to prioritize these costs to standardize the PKB 
with NATO among the many other strategic objectives within its NSS and recent 
strategic defense review (SDR). The Armenians should attempt to staff the PKB to meet 
the NATO PKB standard. As the model demonstrated, this will require a significant 
financial investment. 
A. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
A key limitation of this research was the lack of data and information available 
from the Armenian Armed Forces. Numerous attempts to gain more specific data yielded 
only basic enlisted and officer manpower structure for the PKB, along with the basic unit 
composition. No pay and cost data was available from the Armenian Armed Forces. This 
included costs for pay, allowances, retirement benefits, and other benefits (both current 
and deferred). All pay and benefits in the model were based on assumptions and 
correlations to Western models (U.S. and U.K).  
In addition to the lack of data available, the lack of communication with the 
Armenian Armed Forces inhibited any refining or validating of assumptions. The only 
communication to the Armenian Armed Forces was through the U.S. Embassy, Office of 
Defense Cooperation (ODC), and that was minimal. The many assumptions currently 
limit the realistic application of this model. Further refinements will increase the validity 
and usefulness of this model. Even with these limitations, this research provides the 
Armenian Armed Forces a reasonable framework with which to understand the concepts 
that make up life cycle costs. 
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This project provided a very basic framework for the Armenian Army to study 
LCCs. There are many opportunities within this framework to further their study of 
LCCs. The most viable next step would be to continue to validate the many assumptions 
made in this model, and continue to refine the data. This requires input and feedback 
from the Armenian Armed Forces. The current relationship DRMI and EUCOM have 
with the Armenian Armed Forces, through the U.S. Embassy's ODC in Armenia, can 
provide the access to those stakeholders who can help further the research objectives. By 
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refining the data and validating the assumptions, the model's output becomes more 
realistic and useful. 
Once the Armenians are able to provide more realistic data and help validate the 
assumptions from the initial model, the model can be expanded beyond the PKB to the 
entire Armenian Army, and eventually their entire armed forces. Since manpower costs 
(pay and benefits) are very similar across the various military services, the Armenians 
can scale the model to accommodate the various military services relatively easily. By 
understanding the total LCCs for their manpower, and understanding the appropriate 
costs to include when budgeting over an extended period of time, the Armenians position 
themselves to where, if they choose, they can adopt more program budgeting techniques, 
similar to the best practices of the Western military models. 
While the opportunities to further expand the research on the manpower model is 
the natural first step, further progression can take this to other programs within the 
Armenian Armed Forces, most notably weapons systems, vehicles and equipment. As 
with manpower, the key to producing viable LCC models for these other programs is 
collecting and storing reliable data. A central repository for cost data would provide that 
source. If the Armenians are able to employ the program manager concept, which is used 
in Western military models, this will aid in making those efforts successful. 
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APPENDIX B. BRITISH ARMY OFFICER PAY CHART 2013–2014 
 
RANK ANNUAL
4 Level 5 £100,973
3 Level 4 £100,972
2 Level 3 £99,984
1 Level 2 £98,992
OA Level 1 £98,000
8 Level 9 £90,302
7 Level 8 £89,277
6 Level 7 £88,252
5 Level 6 £87,231
4 Level 5 £86,210
3 Level 4 £85,190
2 Level 3 £84,169
1 Level 2 £83,144
OA Level 1 £82,123
8 Level 9 £78,393
7 Level 8 £77,379
6 Level 7 £76,365
5 Level 6 £75,360
4 Level 5 £71,267
3 Level 4 £70,378
2 Level 3 £69,488
1 Level 2 £68,599
OA Level 1 £67,701
8 Level 9 £57,771
7 Level 8 £56,576
6 Level 7 £55,389
5 Level 6 £54,197
4 Level 5 £52,998
3 Level 4 £51,811
2 Level 3 £50,611
1 Level 2 £49,429
OA Level 1 £48,238
8 Level 9 £45,541
7 Level 8 £45,024
6 Level 7 £44,499
5 Level 6 £43,469
4 Level 5 £42,431
3 Level 4 £41,401
2 Level 3 £40,358
1 Level 2 £39,320
OA Level 1 £38,295
Lieutenant 4 Level 10 £33,029
2nd 
Lieutenant 3 Level 9 £32,240
2 Level 8 £31,458
1 Level 7 £30,672
OA Level 6 £29,882
2Lt Level 5 £24,861
        N/A to 
Army          Level 4 Not Applicable
        2Lt Gap 
Year       .        
Commission Level 3 £19,009
     2Lt Gap 
Year       
Commission   Level 2 £17,441
Off Cdt            Level 1 £15,981
+3 Level 4 £18,149
+2 Level 3 £16,647
1 Level 2 £14,853
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APPENDIX C. BRITISH ARMY ENLISTED PAY CHART 2013–2014 
 
 
HIGHER SPINE LOWER SPINE
RANK RANGE 5 ANNUAL ANNUAL
Level 7 £47,220 £44,561
Level 6 £46,509 £43,336
Level 5 £45,694 £42,153
Level 4 £44,892 £41,347
Level 3 £44,081 £40,544
Level 2 £43,336 £39,742
Level 1 £42,501 £38,985
RANGE 4
Warrant 
Officer 2 Level 9 £43,684 £40,023
Levels 5 - 9 
only Level 8 £43,068 £39,138
Level 7 £42,464 £38,638
Staff 
Sergeant Level 6 £41,860 £38,055
Levels 1 - 7 
only Level 5 £40,954 £36,409
Level 4 £40,044 £35,921
Level 3 £39,138 £35,097
Level 2 £38,224 £33,993
Level 1 £37,323 £33,555
RANGE 3
Level 7 £37,298 £34,452
Level 6 £36,611 £34,192
Level 5 £35,925 £33,050
Level 4 £35,238 £32,211
Level 3 £34,800 £31,888
Level 2 £33,939 £31,106
Level 1 £33,083 £30,312
RANGE 2
Level 7 £33,514 £30,138
Level 6 £32,798 £29,919
Level 5 £32,132 £29,683
Level 4 £31,375 £29,452
Level 3 £30,660 £29,228
Level 2 £29,228 £27,868
Level 1 £27,868 £26,668
RANGE 1
Lance 
Corporal Level 9 £29,228 £24,472
Levels 5 - 9 
only Level 8 £27,868 £23,616
Level 7 £26,668 £22,582
Level 6 £25,498 £21,656
Level 5 £24,315 £21,292
Private Level 4 £21,991 £20,229
Levels 1 - 7 
only Level 3 £20,957 £18,641
Level 2 £19,030 £18,165
Level 1 £17,689 £17,689
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Brigadier O- 7 99,984 $154,975 16,338 10,456,576
Colonel O- 6  86,210 $133,626 14,088 9,016,057
Lieutenant Colonel O- 5  71,267 $110,464 11,646 7,453,280
Major O- 4  52,998 $82,147 8,660 5,542,663
Captain O- 3  42,431 $65,768 6,934 4,437,540
Lieutenant O- 2  31,458 $48,760 5,141 3,289,956


























**Battalion or higher NCO (WO1) E- 9  42,056 $65,187 6,872 4,398,321
*Company NCO (WO2) E- 8 39,403 $61,075 6,439 4,120,885
**Company Sergeant (Staff Sergeant) E- 7  36,746 $56,956 6,005 3,842,946
*Platoon NCO (Sergeant) E- 6  32,816 $50,865 5,363 3,432,021
*Squad NCO (Corporal) E- 5  29,837 $46,247 4,876 3,120,386
Lance Corporal (Level 8) E- 4  24,466 $37,923 3,998 2,558,757
Lance Corporal (Level 6) E- 3  22,424 $34,758 3,664 2,345,200
Private (Level 5) E- 2  21,897 $33,940 3,578 2,290,001




















US‐>Armenia $1 = 406 դր. $1 =  410 դր.
UK‐>US £1 = $1.60 £1 = $1.55
UK‐>Armenia £1 = 651 դր. £1 = 640 դր.
Healthcare Costs
US average/capita for Acitve‐Duty: $19,000 Reference:  RFPB Study: Report FY13‐02









THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 69




Amount (AMD) Amount (AMD) Amount (AMD) Amount (AMD)
Retired Pay: 3,136,973 Retired Pay: 2,704,817 Retired Pay: 2,235,984 Retired Pay: 1,662,799
Retired Healthcare: 122,567 Retired Healthcare: 122,567 Retired Healthcare: 122,567 Retired Healthcare: 122,567
Retired Housing Assistance: 21,085 Retired Housing Assistance: 18,181 Retired Housing Assistance: 15,029 Retired Housing Assistance: 11,177
Other Retired Benefits: Other Retired Benefits: Other Retired Benefits: Other Retired Benefits:
Total In‐Kind Compensation: 143,653 Total In‐Kind Compensation: 140,748 Total In‐Kind Compensation: 137,597 Total In‐Kind Compensation: 133,744
Total Compensation: 3,280,626 Total Compensation: 2,845,565 Total Compensation: 2,373,581 Total Compensation: 1,796,543
ENLISTED
Amount (AMD) Amount (AMD) Amount (AMD) Amount (AMD)
Retired Pay: 1,319,496 Retired Pay: 1,236,265 Retired Pay: 1,152,884 Retired Pay: 1,029,606
Retired Healthcare: 122,567 Retired Healthcare: 122,567 Retired Healthcare: 122,567 Retired Healthcare: 122,567
Retired Housing Assistance: 8,869 Retired Housing Assistance: 8,310 Retired Housing Assistance: 7,749 Retired Housing Assistance: 6,921
Other Retired Benefits: Other Retired Benefits: Other Retired Benefits: Other Retired Benefits:
Total In‐Kind Compensation: 131,437 Total In‐Kind Compensation: 130,877 Total In‐Kind Compensation: 130,317 Total In‐Kind Compensation: 129,488
Total Compensation: 1,450,933 Total Compensation: 1,367,143 Total Compensation: 1,283,201 Total Compensation: 1,159,094
RETIRED PAY COMPENSATION (E‐9) RETIRED PAY COMPENSATION (E‐8) RETIRED PAY COMPENSATION (E‐7) RETIRED PAY COMPENSATION (E‐6)
RETIRED PAY COMPENSATION (O‐7) RETIRED PAY COMPENSATION (O‐6) RETIRED PAY COMPENSATION (O‐5) RETIRED PAY COMPENSATION (O‐4)
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APPENDIX H. MODEL USER IPUTS, INITIAL 
 
  
Brigadier (O-7) 1 Bn/Rgt NCO (E-9) 10
Colonel (O-6) 3 Company NCO (E-8) 10
Lieutenant Colonel (O-5) 8 Company Sergeant (E-7) 10
Major (O-4) 20 Platoon NCO (E-6) 10
Captain (O-3) 17 Corporal (E-5) 30
Lieutenant (O-2) 39 Lance Corporal (E-4) 100
2nd Lieutenant (O-1) 17 Lance Corporal (E-3) 100
Total Officer = 105 Private (E-2) 100
Private (E-1) 100
Total Enlisted = 470
Total Manning = 575
Officer Staffing Enlisted Staffing
Initial Staffing
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APPENDIX I. MODEL USER INPUTS, SUBSEQUENT 
 
 
1) Are you making a structure change?
2
2) Year for Structure Change 12
3) Adjust Staffing levels as needed:
Brigadier (O-7) 2 Bn/Rgt NCO (E-9) 15
Colonel (O-6) 4 Company NCO (E-8) 20
Lieutenant Colonel (O-5) 16 Company Sergeant (E-7) 20
Major (O-4) 30 Platoon NCO (E-6) 20
Captain (O-3) 28 Corporal (E-5) 60
Lieutenant (O-2) 34 Lance Corporal (E-4) 200
2nd Lieutenant (O-1) 21 Lance Corporal (E-3) 300
Total Officer = 135 Private (E-2) 200
Private (E-1) 150
Total Enlisted = 985
Total Manning = 1120
Major Structure Change- Staffing
Officer Staffing Enlisted Staffing
Yes No
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APPENDIX J. OUTPUT OF LCC MODEL, 20-YEAR ACTIVE DUTY 




1 2 3 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐> 19 20
O‐7 10,689,454 10,689,454 10,689,454 10,689,454 10,689,454 213,789,080
O‐6 27,746,804 27,746,804 27,746,804 27,746,804 27,746,804 554,936,085
O‐5 61,489,269 61,489,269 61,489,269 61,489,269 61,489,269 1,229,785,372
O‐4 115,510,821 115,510,821 115,510,821 115,510,821 115,510,821 2,310,216,414
O‐3 79,397,103 79,397,103 79,397,103 79,397,103 79,397,103 1,587,942,068
O‐2 137,390,533 137,390,533 137,390,533 137,390,533 137,390,533 2,747,810,650
O‐1 48,159,359 48,159,359 48,159,359 48,159,359 48,159,359 963,187,180
Officer Total / Year: 480,383,342 480,383,342 480,383,342 480,383,342 480,383,342 9,607,666,849
E‐9 46,311,994 46,311,994 46,311,994 46,311,994 46,311,994 926,239,883
E‐8 43,537,630 43,537,630 43,537,630 43,537,630 43,537,630 870,752,596
E‐7 40,758,245 40,758,245 40,758,245 40,758,245 40,758,245 815,164,910
E‐6 36,648,990 36,648,990 36,648,990 36,648,990 36,648,990 732,979,805
E‐5 100,597,923 100,597,923 100,597,923 100,597,923 100,597,923 2,011,958,469
E‐4 279,163,522 279,163,522 279,163,522 279,163,522 279,163,522 5,583,270,438
E‐3 257,807,777 257,807,777 257,807,777 257,807,777 257,807,777 5,156,155,542
E‐2 252,287,913 252,287,913 252,287,913 252,287,913 252,287,913 5,045,758,264
E‐1 223,084,298 223,084,298 223,084,298 223,084,298 223,084,298 4,461,685,965
Enlisted Total / Year: 1,280,198,294 1,280,198,294 1,280,198,294 1,280,198,294 1,280,198,294 25,603,965,871
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APPENDIX K. OUTPUT OF LCC MODEL, 20-YEAR ACTIVE DUTY 





1 2 3   ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐> 19 20
O‐7 10,689,454 10,689,454 10,689,454 21,378,908 21,378,908 352,751,982
O‐6 27,746,804 27,746,804 27,746,804 36,995,739 36,995,739 675,172,236
O‐5 61,489,269 61,489,269 61,489,269 122,978,537 122,978,537 2,029,145,864
O‐4 115,510,821 115,510,821 115,510,821 173,266,231 173,266,231 3,061,036,749
O‐3 79,397,103 79,397,103 79,397,103 130,771,700 130,771,700 2,255,811,820
O‐2 137,390,533 137,390,533 137,390,533 119,776,362 119,776,362 2,518,826,429
O‐1 48,159,359 48,159,359 48,159,359 59,490,973 59,490,973 1,110,498,160
Officer Total / Year: 480,383,342 480,383,342 480,383,342 664,658,449 664,658,449 12,003,243,240
E‐9 46,311,994 46,311,994 46,311,994 69,467,991 69,467,991 1,227,267,844
E‐8 43,537,630 43,537,630 43,537,630 87,075,260 87,075,260 1,436,741,783
E‐7 40,758,245 40,758,245 40,758,245 81,516,491 81,516,491 1,345,022,101
E‐6 36,648,990 36,648,990 36,648,990 73,297,980 73,297,980 1,209,416,678
E‐5 100,597,923 100,597,923 100,597,923 201,195,847 201,195,847 3,319,731,474
E‐4 279,163,522 279,163,522 279,163,522 558,327,044 558,327,044 9,212,396,222
E‐3 257,807,777 257,807,777 257,807,777 773,423,331 773,423,331 11,859,157,747
E‐2 252,287,913 252,287,913 252,287,913 504,575,826 504,575,826 8,325,501,136
E‐1 223,084,298 223,084,298 223,084,298 334,626,447 334,626,447 5,911,733,904
Enlisted Total / Year: 1,280,198,294 1,280,198,294 1,280,198,294 2,683,506,218 2,683,506,218 43,846,968,889
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21 22 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐> 39 40
O‐7 3,280,626 3,280,626 3,280,626 3,280,626 65,612,512
O‐6 8,536,695 8,536,695 8,536,695 8,536,695 170,733,903
O‐5 18,988,647 18,988,647 18,988,647 18,988,647 379,772,944




Officer Total / Year: 66,736,848 66,736,849 66,736,866 66,736,867 1,334,736,531
E‐9 14,509,329 14,509,329 14,509,329 14,509,329 290,186,583
E‐8 13,671,425 13,671,425 13,671,425 13,671,425 273,428,508
E‐7 12,832,006 12,832,006 12,832,006 12,832,006 256,640,111






Enlisted Total / Year: 52,603,703 52,603,703 52,603,703 52,603,703 1,052,074,058
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APPENDIX M. INPUTS FOR ANNUALIZED MODEL 
 
Rank at Retirement E7
7
Years of Payments in 
Retirement 20









Years of Payments in 
Retirement 20
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APPENDIX N. ANNUALIZED ENLISTED MODEL (OFFICER SIMILAR) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Promotion Rate> E1 E2 E3 E4 E5
1) Cash Basic Pay: 1,997,965 1,997,965 2,290,001 2,290,001 2,345,200 2,558,757 3,120,386 3,120,386
Food: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Housing: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Special Pay: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bonus: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Cash Compensation: 1,997,965 1,997,965 2,290,001 2,290,001 2,345,200 2,558,757 3,120,386 3,120,386
0 0 0 0 0 0
2) In‐Kind A/D Healthcare: 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878
Family Healthcare: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Education Benefits: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other In‐Kind Benefits: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total In‐Kind Compensation: 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878
3) Deferred Retired Pay: 526,161 526,161 526,161 526,161 526,161 526,161 526,161 526,161
Retired Healthcare: 55,938 55,938 55,938 55,938 55,938 55,938 55,938 55,938
Retired Housing Assistance: 3,537 3,537 3,537 3,537 3,537 3,537 3,537 3,537
Other Retired Benefits: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Deferred Compensation: 585,636 585,636 585,636 585,636 585,636 585,636 585,636 585,636
`




9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
E6 E7 E8 E9
3,120,386 3,120,386 3,120,386 3,432,021 3,432,021 3,432,021 3,842,946 3,842,946 3,842,946 3,842,946 3,842,946 3,842,946
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3,120,386 3,120,386 3,120,386 3,432,021 3,432,021 3,432,021 3,842,946 3,842,946 3,842,946 3,842,946 3,842,946 3,842,946
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878 232,878
526,161 526,161 526,161 526,161 526,161 526,161 526,161 526,161 526,161 526,161 526,161 526,161
55,938 55,938 55,938 55,938 55,938 55,938 55,938 55,938 55,938 55,938 55,938 55,938
3,537 3,537 3,537 3,537 3,537 3,537 3,537 3,537 3,537 3,537 3,537 3,537
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
585,636 585,636 585,636 585,636 585,636 585,636 585,636 585,636 585,636 585,636 585,636 585,636
3,938,900 3,938,900 3,938,900 4,250,535 4,250,535 4,250,535 4,661,461 4,661,461 4,661,461 4,661,461 4,661,461 4,661,461
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